We can't find the internet
Attempting to reconnect
Something went wrong!
Hang in there while we get back on track
Comment by Michael Jacob
Council on Strategic Risks fellow
Via the Australia Group and the US Department of Commerce, the US Government should explicitly design export controls to limit open sourcing of the riskiest AI-enabled Biological Design Tools (BDTs).
Since publishing a tool online can be considered an “export,” new export-control restrictions would necessarily limit the ability to freely open source a piece of software. This is a feature, not a bug, of the export control process, since open source should not be a loophole allowing for the proliferation of dangerous AI-enabled software. For these export controls to be effective, the United States should consider adding a new, narrow carve-out to the “publicly available” exclusion.
AI Verified
source
(2024)
7mo ago
Policy proposals and claims
Verification History
AI Verified
Verified: This is from Michael Jacob's July 2024 report "Advances in AI and Increased Biological Risks" for the Council on Strategic Risks. The CSR URL was blocked by WebFetch, but Jacob's authorship and the report's content (export controls via Australia Group and US DoC, AI-enabled Biological Design Tools, restricting open source as a "feature not a bug," carve-outs to "publicly available" exclusion) are confirmed by multiple secondary sources including a Just Security response piece, CSR's later writings, and SSRN-published responses. Year 2024 is correct. The vote "for" on "Ban open source AI models capable of creating WMDs" aligns - Jacob explicitly argues for restricting open sourcing of the riskiest AI BDTs.
·
Hector Perez Arenas
claude-opus-4-7
· 7d ago
replying to Michael Jacob