Comment by Gina Raimondo

We are moving aggressively to reform our current capabilities and create new ones to accomplish this goal. Together with the private sector, we are going to bolster our system of export controls, enhance our investment screening regimes, strengthen our supply chain resiliency, and develop innovative solutions to counter China’s economic coercion and human rights abuses. To begin with, we are redoubling our efforts to safeguard our core technologies by strategically and continuously updating our export control policies and investment screening frameworks. In October, we released a set of rules that impose systematic and technology-specific export controls to limit China’s ability to purchase and manufacture certain very advanced computing chips that are used to train large-scale artificial intelligence models, and which power the country’s advanced military and surveillance systems, as well as the manufacturing equipment used to make these cutting-edge chips. In addition, we restricted American citizens from supporting these advanced technology programs. [...] Now, all of the measures I have outlined—from export controls to new investment parameters to supply chains—require not an only partnership between the U.S. government and private sector but also between the U.S. and our allies and partners. In our competition with China to shape the 21st-century global economy, we cannot go at it alone. When I meet with my counterparts from other countries, they voice similar concerns about China’s behavior and a shared desire to cooperate and coordinate our policies around the rules, standards, and values that advance our collective national security and economic well-being. For example, we have established the Quad Critical and Emerging Technologies working group with Japan, Australia, and India, as well as the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, or TTC, which will be meeting next week in DC, to align our approaches secure supply chains, export controls, data governance, and investment screening. Unverified source (2022)