Comment by Jake Sullivan

So I'll be advised in what I say, because having some discretion in the diplomatic relationships with Japan and the Netherlands was critical to being able to achieve the kind of consensus we were able to achieve on semiconductor manufacturing equipment export controls. So, for your listeners, there's two types of export controls. There's the controls on very high end ships, I think H one hundred Nvidia chips or the Blackwells, and then there are controls on the manufacturing equipment used to make the highest end AI chips and other high end ships. And that equipment is primarily produced by three countries, the United States, the Netherlands, and Japan, and so having all three of us come together around a common understanding of what components and what machines necessary for the manufacture of semiconductors would be controlled was essential for such controls to be effective, and that required persuasion, consultation, really laying out the challenge as we saw it, and it also required a deep level of technical detail, which is why this really was not just about the diplomats or the national security advisors being in the room. It was about technical experts from each of the three countries really working through the reality of this so that it wasn't just a fly by night effort. [...] What they are designed to do is, to the maximum extent possible, make sure that the highest end national security related technology, these very high end AI chips are not going to China to be used against America currents allies. And you know, I can't guarantee zero leakage, that it's not a dynamic scenario where China and others are working to get around them. We just have to keep at it and continue to learn and continue to update.