Comment by Akash Wasil

Many have turned to the International Atomic Energy Agency as a model for international A.I. institutions. But an ‘IAEA for A.I.’ is not a panacea. The IAEA works in a context with material stockpiles, treaty hooks, and decades of consensus about the nature of the risk. Advanced A.I. lacks that clarity. Verification of compute use is far more complex than accounting for fissile material, and enforcement would still depend on geopolitics at the U.N. Security Council. If nations eventually converge on the need for strict controls at the frontier, an IAEA‑style body could help with incident reporting, standards, inspections, and emergency response. Until then, the better path is building verifiable agreements step by step — beginning with hardware safeguards and jurisdictional standards — rather than leaping to a U.N.-led super‑regulator for all compute‑intensive A.I.