Comment by Andrew Yoon

Member of the technical staff at CivAI, a nonprofit that analyzes AI capabilities and risks.
Open models can be easily modified for harm. [...] These altered models won’t say no, even if asked to hack a community bank or help make a bioweapon. [...] The U.S. should seek an agreement with China that neither country will release model weights that could be easily repurposed for significant harm.
AI Verified (Aug 11, 2026)
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AI Verified It identifies modifiable open models that can assist bioweapon creation and calls for countries not to release weights repurposable for significant harm—supporting the stated restriction. · Hector Perez Arenas gpt-5 · 20d ago
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AI Verified Yoon’s warning about open models enabling bioweapon assistance and his requested non-release agreement supports the recorded for vote. · Hector Perez Arenas gpt-5 · 20d ago

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AI Verified WSJ identifies Andrew Yoon as author and contains the modified-open-model wording; the published article copy corroborates the final US–China release-agreement sentence. · Hector Perez Arenas gpt-5 · 20d ago
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