OpenAI

Our Preparedness Framework defines capability thresholds that could lead to severe risk, and risk-specific guidelines to sufficiently minimize the risk of severe harm. For biology, a model that meets a High capability threshold could provide meaningful assistance to novice actors with basic relevant training, enabling them to create biological or chemical threats. If a model reaches a High capability threshold, we won’t release it until we’re confident the risks have been sufficiently mitigated. Our Safety Advisory Group, a cross-functional team of internal leaders, partners with internal safety teams to administer the framework. For high-risk launches, they assess any remaining risks, evaluate the strength of our safeguards, and advise OpenAI leadership on whether it’s safe to move forward. Our Board’s Safety and Security Committee provides oversight of these decisions. This can mean delaying a release, limiting who can use the model, or turning off certain features, even if it disappoints users. For a High biology capability model, this would mean putting in place sufficient safeguards that would bar users from gaining expert capabilities given their potential for severe harm. (2025) source Unverified

We are likely to eventually need something like an IAEA for superintelligence efforts; any effort above a certain capability (or resources like compute) threshold will need to be subject to an international authority that can inspect systems, require audits, test for compliance with safety standards, place restrictions on degrees of deployment and levels of security, etc. But the governance of the most powerful systems, as well as decisions regarding their deployment, must have strong public oversight. We believe people around the world should democratically decide on the bounds and defaults for AI systems. (2023) source Unverified