Anthropic

Our Advanced AI Framework proposes mandatory independent safety testing for frontier models, transparency requirements, and government authority to block or recall dangerous AI deployments.

Compounding the problem, labs in China often release dual-use capable models as open-weight. Once a model is open-weight, safeguards that do exist can be removed, making the model available to any state or non-state actor to use for malicious purpose...

We are not sure whether Claude is a moral patient, and if it is, what kind of weight its interests warrant. But we think the issue is live enough to warrant caution, which is reflected in our ongoing efforts on model welfare.

Before approving a new model for easy or broad internal use (e.g., making the model available via our most-used internal tools), we conduct a pre-deployment review process.

We treat misalignment as a central, but solvable, problem for both us and for the field.

ASL-2 refers to systems that show early signs of dangerous capabilities – [...] give instructions on how to build bioweapons – [...] e.g. a search engine couldn’t.