Expert opinions on International Relations

Allies should establish secure mechanisms to share information on serious AI incidents, emerging catastrophic capabilities, evaluation methods and effective safeguards.

Rather than creating entirely new channels, policymakers should focus on ensuring that existing channels can effectively incorporate information related to frontier models and agents. Building on trusted relationships will be faster and more effectiv...

Australia and the US’s Western allies face an incentive and opportunity structure that may promote, and enable, the less instead of the more destructive options. [...] A government that believes access to American frontier models will remain availabl...

We need to pause all of the research on this, we need to pause all of the application of AI and just sit down and have a proper think about where this is going, where we want it to go, and how we want it to happen and how we want it to be regulated. ...

AI isn’t going away. Barring unprecedented global government coordination, it isn’t even slowing down. The only real decision is whether to centralize power, or disperse it. Do you fear the technology? Or a small number of people controlling the te...

The United States totally rejects any attempt to construct a globalist scheme of control for the artificial intelligence being spoken of so much now – hereinafter officially called super intelligence.

We should also slow down their development until we find a way to make this technology safe and channel its power towards the goals we truly have as a society.

The question that the noble Lord posed was: do we therefore go for a moratorium? That would be highly desirable, but I do not think that it will be possible in the short term.

The Technology Secretary rejected calls to pause the development of artificial intelligence, describing such a move as “a double betrayal” of British talent and British interests.

Decisions involving the use of lethal force, the deprivation of human life, and the escalation of conflict must never be abdicated to autonomous algorithms. Meaningful human control and accountability remain the non-negotiable bedrock of internationa...

A broad consensus has emerged that, regardless of the system, humans must retain responsibility for decisions to use force.

A total prohibition on all autonomous weapons would likely fail to distinguish between high-risk anti-personnel systems and narrowly bounded defensive systems used against incoming missiles or munitions.

To address these issues, we need to build a CERN for AI-assisted science. [...] Canada and the EU have explicitly agreed to explore cooperation on fundamental AI research, agentic systems for scientific discovery, access to advanced AI infrastructure...

But the main regret I have with this talk is that I wish I had prepared a more for the section on a “CERN for AI.” The idea behind such a project is to pool many countries’ and companies’ resources into a single (possibly physically decentralized) ci...

There are many conceivable versions of a “CERN for AI.” But the version that seems politically realistic (a new catch-up lab) probably would not do much for safety, while the versions that would materially improve safety (e.g., pause + merge of all c...

This article therefore recommends that the United Nations General Assembly formally open a pathway toward an International Artificial Intelligence Agency. Governed by its own statute, the agency would have a dual mandate for promotion and verificatio...

The time has come for a more systematic approach to AI regulation — funded by the industry, staffed by world-class technical experts, and answerable to the U.S. government.

Today, the companies are being built elsewhere. Last year the United States produced 59 notable AI models and China produced 35. France and the United Kingdom produced one each. Along the rest of the AI value chain, the picture is the same: the Unite...

Europe should prioritize “code over concrete.”

Middle powers should combine complementary national assets and pool the capabilities that require scale, while preserving national and commercial control over applications, deployment, language, and sector-specific use. Shared efforts could include m...

The answer isn't convergence for its own sake. We can push too hard on one thing. But if you have one standard, you could risk a lowest common denominator outcome that can cost us the innovation system as well and might have a risk on the national in...

The bills include the AI OVERWATCH Act, the Chip Security Act, and the MATCH Act. Anthropic supports all three bills and is ending its membership in ITI over the group's efforts to block them from passing.

Our membership is aligned that these bills undermine the American tech stack, and as our Thursday letter demonstrates, there is widespread support for this position across the technology and broader business sectors.

A covered developer — Compute threshold: 10^26 FLOP — has trained or initiated the training of a frontier model, a model trained using, or undergoing training intended to use, at least 10^26 floating-point operations of compute. [...] Covered develop...

According to the proposed rule, a covered US person will be required to provide quarterly reports to BIS if the US person “engages in, or plans, within six months, to engage in ‘applicable activities.’” “Applicable activities” include: “Conducting a...

Policymakers do not need to approach each innovation in isolation and should not treat every emerging technology as a first-of-its-kind policy problem.

This means that in 2026-2027 we could end up in one of two starkly different worlds. In the US, multiple companies will definitely have the required millions of chips (at the cost of tens of billions of dollars). The question is whether China will al...

China consistently opposes any practice of overstretching the concept of national security and abusing export controls.

This paper proposes Europa Nova: a treaty-based research institution, modelled on CERN but with a commercial licensing arm, dedicated to sovereign European capability in frontier AI, up to and including safe artificial general intelligence. [...] One...

A semi-distributed structure, with a few core facilities, leveraging members' comparative advantages. Core facilities—fewer in number than the participating states—are necessary to create a critical mass of talent. Similarly, distributed compute can ...

Any serious European AI initiative must include the United Kingdom. DeepMind, based in London, is one of the world's three or four leading AI research laboratories. ARM's chip architecture underpins a significant share of global computing. The UK AI ...

One of its more interesting recommendations is something called Mutually Assured Compute Destruction. America would build its new datacentres in Mongolia and China would build theirs in Canada. If the agreement collapsed, each side would destroy its ...

Plan A is the alternative. Delay superintelligence to 2040. Make all AI research public. Let dozens of companies in dozens of countries catch up to the frontier. And enter, deliberately and with eyes open, a regime of mutually assured compute destruc...

A doctrine whose trigger mechanism can be this thoroughly disputed cannot function as a deterrent. Deterrence requires certainty. MAD worked because both sides knew, with something close to certainty, what a launch would produce. MACD, as currently s...